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ECONOMIC INSTRUCTION
The Pollution Game: A Classroom Game Demonstrating





groups—a government regulatory agency and two polluting ﬁrms—and allows them to work through
a system of uniform command-and-control regulation, a tradable emissions permit framework, and
an emissions tax. Students observe how ﬂexible, market-oriented regulatory frameworks can outper-
form inﬂexible command-and-control. More important, given the ongoing debate about how best to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions, students also can observe how the introduction of abatement-cost
uncertainty can cause one market-oriented solution to outperform another.
Keywords classroom experiments, emissions taxes, pollution, tradable emissions permits
JEL codes A20, Q52, Q53, Q54, Q58
Students in introductory and environmental economics courses learn that government regulators
can employ policies such as uniform regulation, emissions taxes, and tradable emissions permits
in response to the negative externalities from pollution. Although students learn that ﬂexible,
market-oriented policy options have the potential to produce more efﬁcient outcomes, textbooks
generallyincludelittlediscussionoftherelativestrengthsofvariousmarket-orientedframeworks.
This classroom game illustrates the efﬁciency gains from various government policies aimed
at internalizing negative externalities, as well as problems that arise due to heterogeneous abate-
ment costs, asymmetric information, and strategic behavior on the part of the regulated ﬁrms.
While other games demonstrate different policies that regulators can use to internalize negative
externalities (e.g., Bergstrom and Miller 1999, Hazlett and Bakkensen 2005), none speciﬁcally
highlight the distinct regulatory challenges these policies present.
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In the absence of uncertainty about abatement costs, tradable permits and emissions taxes
should be equally effective at bringing about the optimal level of pollution abatement. And unlike
uniform command-and-control regulation, this result holds even if ﬁrms have heterogeneous
abatement costs. A point that is more difﬁcult to convey in undergraduate courses, but that is
at least as important given the current debate over how governments should regulate carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions, is how well we can expect tradable-permit and emissions tax schemes
to perform relative to one another if abatement costs are uncertain. This uncertainty could come
from several sources. For example, suppose polluters have perfect information regarding their
abatement costs, but have a strategic incentive to either over- or understate these true costs. In
this case, the regulator will receive an imperfect signal of true abatement costs.
If regulators overestimate the true marginal cost of abatement under an emissions tax frame-
work,theywillsetthetaxrateundesirably high.Andif,asMcKibbinandWilcoxen (2002)argue,
the marginal beneﬁt of CO2 abatement in a given year is ﬂat, while the marginal cost increases
rapidly, this higher tax rate leads to a modest level of overabatement and a modest deadweight
loss. On the other hand, if regulators overestimate the true marginal cost of abatement under
a tradable-permit framework, they will issue an undesirably large number of permits. Under
the same marginal-beneﬁt and marginal-cost assumptions, this leads to a substantial level of
underabatement and a deadweight loss much larger than that under a tax.1
PROCEDURES
The game takes about 50 minutes. It will work in classes with as few as three students or as
many as 100, but the ideal class size is probably between 15 and 30 students.2 The game, while
designed primarily for undergraduate environmental economics courses, can be used in any
public policy, environmental studies, or economics course that covers environmental regulation.
The game is intended for students who have at minimum been introduced to the concepts of
marginal analysis and externality. Students do not necessarily need to have been exposed to
formal models of emissions taxes and tradable permits, but if they have not, the instructor will
need to brieﬂy explain the optimal strategies under each regime (i.e., the per-ton tax rate should
equal the marginal beneﬁt from abatement at the optimal level of pollution, and the number of
permits issued should equal the optimal level of pollution).
The instructor begins by dividing the class into three groups of roughly equal size—the
government regulatory agency, Ace Energy, and Deuce Petrochemical—giving each student in
eachgrouptheappropriateinstructionsheet.Condensedversionsoftheseinstructionsareincluded
in the appendix.3 Note that Deuce’s abatement costs are twice Ace’s costs.
In the game’s ﬁrst phase, the focus is on the government regulatory agency. The regulator’s
goal is to bring about the socially optimal level of abatement, while minimizing cost to industry.4
The regulator’s handout provides information about the social beneﬁt associated with abatement
(and, by extension, the social damage caused by pollution). The ﬁrms’ abatement costs, however,
are private information available only to a given ﬁrm. The regulator can ask each ﬁrm questions
about itsabatement cost structure(e.g.,“What’s your totalcost of reducing pollution by10tons?”
or “What’s the additional cost of the 10th ton of abatement?”), although ﬁrms are free to respond
strategically.5 While this questions-and-answers stage can be as structured or as informal as an
instructor chooses, one effective strategy is to instruct the regulator to come up with a ﬁxed72 CORRIGAN
number of questions (e.g., four) that it will write on the board with the understanding that both
ﬁrms will then answer these and only these questions. Experience suggests that both ﬁrms will
likely overstate their abatement costs. Astute regulators will recognize this and do their best to
compensate.
Once the regulator has arrived at its best estimate of the optimal level of abatement, it si-
multaneously constructs three distinct pollution control schemes: (1) a uniform command-and-
control framework requiring both ﬁrms to reduce emissions by the same amount; (2) a cap-and-
trade framework where the regulator makes available a ﬁxed number of pollution permits; and
(3) an emissions tax framework where each ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁxed dollar amount for each ton of
pollution it chooses to generate.
In the game’s second phase, attention turns to the polluting ﬁrms. The ﬁrms begin by choosing
their level of abatement in response to the regulator’s command-and-control regulation. This is
straightforward because both ﬁrms are instructed to reduce emissions by the same amount. Each
ﬁrmthencalculates(butdoesnotreveal)thetotalcostofcompliancewiththisregulatorystructure,
and the regulator announces the total beneﬁt that society derives from abatement. Finally, the
instructor announces the extent of the deadweight loss under command-and-control regulation.
Note that it is important that the instructor not announce at this stage whether the deadweight loss
is the result of too much pollution, too much abatement, or simply a misallocation of abatement
across ﬁrms. This would take away some of the suspense from later regulatory rounds and might
give a ﬁrm information about its rival’s abatement cost structure.
In the second regulatory round, the regulator allocates tradable emissions permits to ﬁrms. At
the instructor’s discretion, these permits either can be auctioned off or given away to ﬁrms for
free. In the former case, an ascending-price English auction works well and should be familiar
to students. The instructor starts by naming a low selling price (e.g., $5 per permit) and then
raises the price incrementally until one ﬁrm drops out of the auction. In the interest of time, the
instructormaywanttostartbyauctioningoffabundleofﬁvepermitsandthenauctionsubsequent
permits individually. If permits are to be given away, the instructor also should allow ﬁrms to
trade permits informally. Here, each ﬁrm might select one student to bargain over the price and
quantity of permits bought from or sold to the competing ﬁrm. These deliberations are made
openly so that everyone in class can observe. The instructor could encourage these two students
to begin their bargaining with questions like “What’s the lowest price you’d be willing to sell
one permit for?” or “What’s the highest price you’d be willing to pay for ﬁve permits?” Both
bargainers are, of course, free to respond to these questions strategically, though a few minutes of
negotiating generally allows students to reach some kind of agreement. The instructor may wish
to limit these negotiations to ﬁve minutes to keep the game moving.
Once permits are allocated, the regulator again announces the total beneﬁt from abatement,
and ﬁrms calculate the total cost of compliance net any proceeds from permit sales or purchases.
The instructor then announces the deadweight loss for this second regulatory round.
Deadweight loss under permits generally will be less than that under command-and-control
regulation unless permits were allocated very poorly at the end of the permit negotiations or the
regulator chose to allow a less-optimal quantity of pollution than in the command-and-control
round. To help students understand why this market-oriented framework outperforms command-
and-control,theinstructorcanasktheﬁrmstoannouncetheirtotalabatementcostsunderboththe
command-and-control and cap-and-trade regulatory frameworks. Assuming the regulator settled
on the same level of pollution under both schemes, the total level of abatement (and thereforeTHE POLLUTION GAME 73
totaldamagefrompollution)willbethesameinbothrounds,butintroducingamarketforpermits
allows industry to achieve a given level of abatement at lower cost.
In the third, and ﬁnal, regulatory round, ﬁrms respond to the emissions tax set by the regulator
inthegame’sﬁrstphasebychoosingalevelofabatementthatminimizescompliancecosts,inthis
case deﬁned as abatement costs plus total emissions taxes paid. This should be a straightforward
application of the equimarginal principle (i.e., ﬁrms abate so long as the cost of one more ton
of abatement is less than or equal to the cost of paying the emissions tax). Experience suggests,
however,thatstudentsmayneedagentlereminder.Oncebothﬁrmshavedeterminedtheiroptimal
abatement levels, they can announce what these levels are along with their total compliance costs.
The regulator again calculates and announces the total beneﬁt from abatement, and the instructor
announces the deadweight loss. The marginal-cost and -beneﬁt schedules from the appendix are
structured such that the marginal cost of abatement is the steeper of the two curves. With this in
mind, the deadweight loss from this third regulatory round will likely be the smallest of the three
rounds.
DISCUSSION
This game can generate a rich class discussion. To begin, the instructor may use the game to high-
light the predictions and assumptions of economic theory. For instance, experience suggests that
both market-oriented frameworks will outperform the uniform command-and-control standard.
Students should be able to see that this is due to the market-oriented frameworks’ ﬂexibility in
dealing with heterogeneous abatement costs. More formally, table 1 details the marginal-beneﬁt
and aggregated marginal-cost schedules from the appendix. The marginal beneﬁt and marginal
cost of abatement are equated when industry reduces pollution by 18 tons, with low-cost Ace
TABLE 1
Marginal-Beneﬁt and Marginal-Cost Schedules
Tons of Marginal Marginal Firm Tons of Marginal Marginal Firm
pollution abated beneﬁt cost abating pollution abated beneﬁt cost abating
1 $65 $4A c e 1 6 $50 $44 Ace
2 $64 $8A c e 1 7 $49 $48 Ace
3 $63 $8 Deuce 18 $48 $48 Deuce
4 $62 $12 Ace 19 $47 $52 Ace
5 $61 $16 Ace 20 $46 $56 Ace
6 $60 $16 Deuce 21 $45 $56 Deuce
7 $59 $20 Ace 22 $44 $60 Ace
8 $58 $24 Ace 23 $43 $64 Deuce
9 $57 $24 Deuce 24 $42 $72 Deuce
10 $56 $28 Ace 25 $41 $80 Deuce
11 $55 $32 Ace 26 $40 $88 Deuce
12 $54 $32 Deuce 27 $39 $96 Deuce
13 $53 $36 Ace 28 $38 $104 Deuce
14 $52 $40 Ace 29 $37 $112 Deuce
15 $51 $40 Deuce 30 $36 $120 Deuce74 CORRIGAN
reducing its pollution by 12 tons, while high-cost Deuce reduces its pollution by just six tons.
Using the total beneﬁt and total cost ﬁgures from the appendix, this level of abatement brings
about $1,017 in total beneﬁts at a total cost to industry of just $480—yielding a substantially
greater net beneﬁt than if both ﬁrms were forced to reduce pollution by a uniform nine tons.
Students also may discover that market-oriented frameworks can lead to a cost-effective
solution even if the government chooses an inefﬁcient tax level or number of permits. For
example, facing a tax rate of $24 per ton (half of the efﬁcient level), low-cost Ace should still
reduceitspollutionbytwiceasmuchashigh-costDeuce.Thesameshouldholdifthegovernment
auctions off 24 permits instead of the optimal 12. This is especially pertinent given that pollution
targets are in practice inﬂuenced as much by political expediency as by economic efﬁciency
(Joskow and Schmalensee 1998).
This game also can highlight the difference between the market-oriented abatement frame-
works. For example, astute students will realize that tax and permit schemes present different
incentives for ﬁrms to strategically misrepresent abatement costs. Firms have an incentive to
understate their marginal-abatement costs in anticipation of an emissions tax because this could
lead to the actual tax rate’s being set below the optimal level. Conversely, ﬁrms have an incentive
to overstate their marginal-abatement costs in anticipation of a permit framework because this
could lead the regulator to issuing permits in excess of the optimal number. Occasionally students
have recognized this at the outset of the game and have split the difference by honestly answering
the regulator’s questions in the game’s ﬁrst phase.
The game’s results generally show that while both market-oriented regulatory frameworks
outperform command-and-control regulation, taxes outperform permits given the built-in uncer-
taintyandtherelativeslopesofthemarginal-beneﬁtand-costcurves.Forexample,iftheregulator
were to overestimate marginal-abatement cost by a factor of two, table 1 suggests that it would
require each ﬁrm to reduce pollution by ﬁve tons under the command-and-control framework,
that it would issue 20 permits under the cap-and-trade framework, and that it would set a $56
per-ton emissions tax. Command-and-control framework would yield 10 tons of abatement and
$425 in net beneﬁts (a $112 deadweight loss relative to the efﬁcient outcome). Tradable permits
would yield 10 tons of abatement and $445 in net beneﬁts (a $92 deadweight loss relative to the
efﬁcient outcome). And a tax would yield 21 tons of abatement and $511 in net beneﬁts (just a
$26 deadweight loss relative to the efﬁcient outcome).
Although this result can be shown graphically, grasping the intuition can be challenging for
students. A few minutes of discussion should help students to see that when marginal-abatement
costs are initially low but then increase quickly, placing an inﬂexible cap on emissions through
permits,ontheonehand,canleadtosituationswherethemarginalcostofthelasttonofabatement
is dramatically greater than or less than the marginal beneﬁt from that last ton. Placing an upper
limit on marginal-abatement cost by using a tax, on the other hand, allows ﬁrms to pollute more
or less than regulators originally envisioned, which in this scenario can lead to a more efﬁcient
outcome.
The instructor should stress, however, that taxes will not always outperform permits. The
regulatory framework likely to yield the more efﬁcient outcome depends critically on the nature
of the pollutant and the associated abatement technology. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) argue
that because of the long-lived nature of CO2 in the atmosphere, the marginal damage from
CO2 emissions in any given year (or, alternatively, the marginal beneﬁt from CO2 abatement) is
roughly constant. The marginal cost of abatement in any given year, on the other hand, increasesTHE POLLUTION GAME 75
rapidly as ﬁrms and households quickly exhaust low-cost abatement alternatives (e.g., switching
to compact-ﬂorescent light bulbs) and have to turn to more-expensive technologies (e.g., by
replacing electricity from coal-ﬁred power plants with more expensive renewable energy). Under
these assumptions, a tax will generally outperform permits from an efﬁciency standpoint.
In other cases, permits will outperform a tax. In the case of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions
linked to respiratory illness and acid rain, for example, the marginal damage from emissions in
any given time period increase rapidly as ground-level SO2 concentrations cross the threshold for
humansafety(ChestnutandMills2005).Themarginalcostofabatement, incontrast,isrelatively
ﬂat given that the primary means for reducing SO2 is switching to low-sulfur coal from Utah’s
Powder River Basin (Schmalensee et al. 1998).
The instructor also may ask students to think about the extent to which the ordering of
rounds inﬂuenced outcomes. For example, did command-and-control framework underperform
the market-oriented approaches simply because it was the ﬁrst regulatory regime that ﬁrms
encountered? What, if anything, did ﬁrms learn in the command-and-control framework and
permit rounds that they could have used to gain a strategic advantage in the ﬁnal tax round?
Finally, the instructor may wish to spend a few minutes on the nature of uncertainty in this
exercise and in environmental policy more generally. Here, polluters had perfect information
about their abatement costs, but the regulator received only an imperfect signal of those costs. In
reality, it is more likely that no party will have perfect information. For example, in the case of
CO2 emissions, it is impossible to predict with any certainty what abatement technologies will be
available in 10 years, let alone how much those technologies will cost to implement. Season-to-
season temperature ﬂuctuations will inﬂuence the demand for heating fuels, affecting the cost of
achievinganygivenemissionstarget.ThebeneﬁtsofCO2 abatementalsoarenecessarilyuncertain
given the vagaries of forecasting the climate decades into the future. This is not necessarily an
argument against regulation, but policy makers should be aware of the ways in which different
regulatory frameworks perform in the presence of uncertainty.
Instructors have a wealth of additional readings to choose from regarding market-oriented
pollution control frameworks, especially as they relate to SO2 and CO2 emissions. Schmalensee
et al. (1998) and Stavins (1998) provide brief, accessible overviews of the economics of SO2
allowance trading. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of tax
and permit frameworks as they relate to CO2 emissions from both the standpoint of economic
theory and that of political economy. Instructors interested in a more popular take on the tax-
versus-permit debate might consider Mankiw’s (2006) op-ed in the Wall Street Journal and
Stavins’s (2008) op-ed in the Boston Globe.
NOTES
1. Figuresdepictingmarginalbeneﬁt,marginalcost,anddeadweightlossunderbothscenariosareavailable
for download at http://economics.kenyon.edu/corrigan/pollutiongame/.
2. For large classes, the instructor may wish to divide students into two or more economies, each with its
own regulatory agency and industries.
3. Full versions of the instructions and other useful ancillary materials are available for download at
http://economics.kenyon.edu/corrigan/pollutiongame/.
4. Although the instructions are written assuming that the regulator’s goal is to maximize society’s overall
well-being,theinstructormaychoosetooffertheregulatortheoptionofchoosingitsownobjective,taking
a moment to point out the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. For example, the regulator can76 CORRIGAN
choose to minimize pollution, but this will impose a high cost on ﬁrms and, eventually, their customers.
Conversely, the regulator may choose to maximize permit or tax revenue, although depending on the
elasticity of ﬁrms’ pollution demand, this may lead to either too much pollution or too little pollution
relative to the socially optimal level.
5. An instructor wishing to devote more attention to strategic interaction may wish to introduce a Kwerel
mechanism. Kwerel (1977) shows that when the regulator (1) issues Z permits such that the marginal
beneﬁt from abatement equals the industry’s stated marginal abatement cost, and (2) commits to buying
back unused permits at a price equal to the marginal beneﬁt from abatement at Z, ﬁrms can do no
better than to accurately report their costs. This would, among other things, serve as a starting point
for a discussion of the larger mechanism design literature. However, this approach also adds time and
complexity to the exercise. See English and Yates (2007) for a current and accessible review of the recent
literature.
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APPENDIX
INSTRUCTION SHEETS FOR THE THREE GROUPS
The Regulator
In everything you do, your goal is to maximize society’s well-being. The problem in front of you
right now is the regulation of air pollution generated by industry. While it’s virtually impossible for
ﬁrms to do business without also generating some amount of air pollution, the quantity of pollution
can be controlled using any number of techniques (for example, by using inputs more efﬁciently or
by installing abatement equipment). Your crack staff of environmental toxicologists, engineers, and
economists has put together the following table [table A1] describing the beneﬁts society derives
from reducing air pollution.
You’ll need to ﬁnd a way to motivate ﬁrms to limit air pollution to the efﬁcient level. You’ll start
by asking ﬁrms about their abatement costs (bearing in mind that they may not be entirely truthfulTHE POLLUTION GAME 77
TABLE A1
The Regulator: Beneﬁts That Society Derives from Reducing Air Pollution
Tons of pollution Marginal Total Tons of pollution Marginal Total
abated beneﬁt beneﬁt abated beneﬁt beneﬁt
1 $65 $65 16 $50 $920
2 $64 $129 17 $49 $969
3 $63 $192 18 $48 $1,017
4 $62 $254 19 $47 $1,064
5 $61 $315 20 $46 $1,110
6 $60 $375 21 $45 $1,155
7 $59 $434 22 $44 $1,199
8 $58 $492 23 $43 $1,242
9 $57 $549 24 $42 $1,284
10 $56 $605 25 $41 $1,325
11 $55 $660 26 $40 $1,365
12 $54 $714 27 $39 $1,404
13 $53 $767 28 $38 $1,442
14 $52 $819 29 $37 $1,479
15 $51 $870 30 $36 $1,515
in their responses). Once you come up with your best guess of abatement costs, you can determine
the optimal level of emissions. With this number in mind, you’ll need to determine (1) a uniform





at the efﬁcient level of pollution while imposing the lowest possible costs on industry.
Ace Energy
Your goal at Ace is really, really simple: You want to maximize proﬁts. You don’t care about trees or
ﬂowers or dolphins or anything else. All you want to do is to make the most money you possibly can.
On the way to achieving that goal, you want to spend as little as possible on pollution abatement.
Left on your own, you’d generate 15 tons of air pollution every year, though you can reduce that
amount by pursuing costly abatement. Your pollution abatement costs are detailed below [table A2].
The government regulator will ask you questions about these costs and use your answers to design
three different pollution control policies. You’re free to over- or understate your true costs if you think
that’s in your best interest.
Deuce Petrochemical
Your goal at Deuce is really, really simple: You want to maximize proﬁts. You don’t care about trees
or ﬂowers or dolphins or anything else. All you want to do is to make the most money you possibly
can. On the way to achieving that goal, you want to spend as little as possible on pollution abatement.78 CORRIGAN
TABLE A2
Ace Energy’s Pollution Abatement Costs
Tons of pollution Marginal Total abatement
















Left on your own, you’d generate 15 tons of air pollution every year, though you can reduce that
amount by pursuing costly abatement. Your pollution abatement costs are detailed below (table A3).
The government regulator will ask you questions about these costs and use your answers to design
three different pollution control policies. You’re free to over- or understate your true costs if you think
that’s in your best interest.
TABLE A3
Deuce Petrochemical’s Pollution Abatement Costs
Tons of pollution Marginal Total abatement
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